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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN R. COX 
vs. 
J. R. BERRY 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
L. P. SLAGLE, JOSEPH ANDERSON, 
VIVIAN SCHELLAR, ROBERT 
GRAHAM AND RILEY DRAPER 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents 
Case No. 
10744 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The original action was filed by Marvin R. Cox to re-
cover $5,000.00 loaned to J. R. Berry on October 27, 1964 
with 10% interest thereon, founded on a written instru-
ment (R. 1). 
2 
Mr. J. R. Berry in turn filed a third-party action 
against five defendant directors of Zions Investment 
Corporation. This alleged claim rests on an alleged 
memorandum agreement of indemnification, dated No-
vember 11, 1965 (Ex. 2, R. 6). A further claim against 
three of said five directors rests upon an alleged more 
formal agreement of November 16, 1965 (Ex. 3, R. 6a-9). 
Mr. Berry's complaint prays that the third-party de-
fendants pay his debt if Mr. Marvin R. Cox secures judg-
ment against him. 
The third-party defendants contended that the naked 
resignation of a director and president of a corporation 
for an indemnification promise of economic value is an 
illegal consideration as against public policy. A defense 
to the alleged agreement of November 16, 1965 was that 
it states on its face a lack of consideration. Additional 
defenses are that both alleged agreements are void for 
unfilled conditions, that the alleged memorandum is void 
for indefiniteness, and that the facts create an estoppel 
against J. R. Berry. 
DISPOSITION OF THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
IN THE LOWER COURT 
The third-party defendants filed motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment, since one of said defendants 
had filed an answer. Defendants' motions were supported 
by three affidavits with numerous exhibits. A counter-
affidavit was filed by J. R. Berry. The motions were 
heard before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
of the Third Judicial District and were granted in the 
form of a summary judgment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The third-party defendants pray that the Summary 
Judgment of the District Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During 1963 and until November 17, 1965 Mr. J. R. 
Berry was President and a Director of Zions Investment 
Corporation, a Utah corporation. During 1963 and until 
late on November 11, 1965 J. R. Berry was promoter, 
chief salesman, supervisor of salesmen, supervisor of the 
Company Prospectus of March 1, 1965 and general man-
ager of company operations. According to said Company 
Prospectus the corporation sold canyon building lots on 
its Swiss Alpine properties, situated a short distance 
Southwesterly from the Homestead near Midway in Wa-
satch County, Utah during 1963 and 1964 for $159,893.46 
in cash and contracts (R. 18) . 
On December 27, 1963 at a meeting of the Executive 
Committee J. R. Berry represented to the corporation 
that he believed it could and should secure an option to 
purchase the Homestead property. On said date the cor-
poration authorized Berry to negotiate for the purchase 
by the corporation of the Homestead property. The cor-
poration authorized a price of $350,000, with a down pay-
ment of $115,000 and a conservative, easy-to-meet, annual 
payment of $21,000 until paid with interest at 6% on the 
purchase price (Minutes R. 30-31). Mr. Berry borrowed 
personally at 10 % interest rate, supra. 
The corporate minutes of December 27, 1963 clearly 
show that there was no intent on the part of the corpor-
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ation that its duly appointed agent Berry should nego-
tiate for the purchase of the Homestead for the corpora-
tion as an undisclosed principal. The authorization shows 
a clear intent that the agent should conduct such negoti-
ations on an open and above-board relationship with the 
owners of the Homestead for the corporation and report 
back to the corporation. If there were in J. R. Berry's 
mind on December 27, 1963 a secret intent that he would 
purchase the Homestead for himself and wife for his own 
personal purpose to be divulged nearly two years later, 
he studiously avoided the slightest suggestion of such 
intent. In violation of his fiduciary obligation he nego-
tiated the purchase of the Homestead for himself and 
purchased it for himself and wife, not purporting to act 
for the corporation (R. 30-31, 19). 
No corporate minutes and no affidavit of any con-
ference with any corporate officer is had showing at any 
time that the claim of a security interest was ever men-
tioned by J. R. Berry or anyone connected with the cor-
poration. This new idea of a security interest for an agent 
who violates his agency for his own interest was ad-
vanced for the first time in the affidavit of J. R. Berry 
on the 21st day of September 1966 on the stationery of 
"Law offices of Thomas, Armstrong, Rawlings and West" 
(R. 23). What are the facts that are supported by the un-
contradicted evidence appearing from the affidavits filed 
in this case? 
First, President and Director J. R. Berry called all 
directors and stockholders meetings when he had con-
cluded that any such meeting was necessary. He man-
aged the corporate properties and affairs "in a manner 
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primarily as if" they "were his own, making incomplete 
reports to the Board of Directors only when he wanted 
to and only to the extent he determined" (Affidavit of 
Directors Draper, Graham, and Anderson R. 53). 
Second, J. R. Berry negotiated ONLY for himself and 
wife for his own herein-claimed, personal interest (an-
tagonistic to the corporation) in purchasing the Home-
stead. He was not authorized to act in a secret manner for 
the corporation as an undisclosed principal. He did not 
purport to act on behalf of the corporation which is in 
fact and law an essential requirement before a valid legal 
ratification can occur. Mechem, Outlines of Agency, 4th 
ed., Sec. 203. Mr. Berry borrowed $5,000.00 from Marvin 
R. Cox, plaintiff, solely on his own credit and another 
$20,000 from other parties similarly to make his own 
down payment of $25,000 on his own personal purchase 
with his wife of the Homestead on December 1, 1964 
(R. 4). Neither Berry nor his wife personally furnished 
any of the purchase price. Only Berry signed the written 
agreements to secure the funds for the down payment 
(R. 1). 
Third, J. R. Berry did not during the entire year of 
1964 call any director's meeting and/or report to any 
members of the board that he was financing his own pur-
chase of the Homestead. The first board of directors meet-
ing at which he reported the purchase of the Homestead 
was held March 25, 1965 nearly four months after he 
purchased the Homestead for himself and wife (Secre-
tary Anderson's affidavit R. 26 and 35-36). 
Fourth, the plan and scheme which Mr. J. R. Berry 
pursued was to call a stockholders' meeting to be held on 
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February 20, 1965. It was called (R. 32). He reported 
there the personal purchase of the Homestead and pro-
posed there a contract with the corporatioa that he and 
his wife would assign their rights and convey their in-
terests in the Homestead purchase contract to the cor-
poration if the corporation would vote by all its stock-
holders assembled "to assume all duties and obligations 
of First Parties" (Mr. and Mrs. Berry) in the said ac-
quisition (R. 6a and 19). 
The minutes of that stockholders' meeting were sup-
posed to have been drafted by Mrs. Kathleen Berry, 
whom Mr. Berry nominated to act as secretary of the 
meeting which nomination was approved (R. 32). They 
are susceptible of an interpretation that the said proposed 
agreement of J. R. Berry was understood and was ap-
proved unanimously by the stockholders (R. 32). The 
fact and law is that there could be no ratification of Mr. 
and Mrs. Berry's actions. She had never been appointed 
as an agent of the corporation, and Mr. Berry in buying 
the Homestead for himself and wife did not purport to 
the seller to be acting for Zions Investment Corporation 
within the scope of his authority. (R. 30-32 & 19). 
Fifth, promptly after the stockholders' meeting of Feb-
ruary 20, 1965 J. R. Berry furnished information for and 
supervised the printing of a company "PROSPECTUS" 
dated March 1, 1965. Therein is confirmed publicly the 
agreement for and the assignment to the corporation of 
the Homestead purchase contract of the Berrys. (R. 19). 
The Prospectus declares the Homestead to be the prop-
erty of the corporation and on page four thereof reads as 
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follows: 
The contract was assigned by this group to the com-
pany and accepted by the company at a special 
meeting of the stockholders on February 20, 1965. 
Mr. Berry received no bonus-for his efforts. Others 
of the group are to be repaid the sums paid by them 
on the purchase price in capital stock of the company 
at $1.25 per share or by return of their cash plus 
interest (10% simple) on or before October 31, 1965. 
The Company must make a payment of $50,000 on 
or before April 1, 1965 and at that time assume pos-
session of the property ( R. 19) . 
Sixth, a board of directors meeting was duly called and 
held March 25th, 1965. Mr. Berry reported that he had 
been unable to raise money to pay the $50,000 payment 
on the Homestead purchase contract due April 1, 1965 
(R. 35). A resolution was passed authorizing the corpora-
tion to borrow $50,000 and pledging the directors to co-
sign the note (R. 36). The note was signed as agreed (R. 
37) and nearly six months later demand made upon the 
directors for payment of $39,262.20 on October 25, 1965 
(R. 38). In signing said $50,000 note the third-party de-
fendants fully relied upon the representations of Berry 
and upon the agreement of Berry and wife reaffirmed in 
print on page 4 of the Prospectus (R. 19) that the corpor-
ation at the February 20th stockholders meeting had ac-
cepted the offered assignment of the Homestead purchase 
contract and had become bound to reimburse Mr. Berry 
for his loans made in acquisition of said contract (R. 54). 
The Prospectus unequivocally stated that the Homestead 
was the property of the corporation (R. 19). This was re-
peatedly told to stockholders (R. 54, 59, 60 and 61), of-
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ficers, prospective stock purchasers and prospective con-
dominium purchasers (R. 54, 59, 60 and 61) by Berry and 
his salesmen. 
Seventh, J. R. Berry makes a controlling admission in 
his pleadings, Exhibit 3 thereof, (R. 6a) which over his 
signature reads as follows: 
WHEREAS, First Parties have held the said prop-
erty and rights as trustees for Second Party since on 
and after a certain meeting of the stockholders of 
Zions Investment Corporation held, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah on the 20th day of February, 1965, where-
at the stockholders accepted the conveyance of said 
property and rights and agreed to assume all duties 
and obligations of First Parties (Mr. and Mrs. Berry) 
respecting the said acquisition; ... (R. 6a). 
The foregoing is a binding admission that the Berrys 
were legally bound to assign all their interest and rights 
as trustees to the corporation prior to the signing of the 
alleged agreements of November 11th and 16th, 1965. 
They had received valid consideration for said obligation. 
Eighth, Mr. Berry repeatedly made informal state-
ments of glowing sales reports. For example, he reported 
sales of lots during 1964 for $159,893.46 on which cash 
of $76,818.32 was realized (R. 19) and in a letter to Sec-
retary Anderson on July 21, 1965 stated that "in these 
past months" preceding June 30th sales were made in 
the total of $155,500.00 (R. 41). However, as usual, re-
garding expenditures, Mr. Berry reported only that "Our 
cash outlays are considerable." When the directors were 
served with a demand on October 25, 1965 to pay nearly 
$40,000 personally on the corporate note to First Security 
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State Bank the dissatisfactions with corporate manage-
ment by Mr. Berry became acute. Later bankruptcy of 
the corporation resulted (R. 16). 
Ninth, on November 9, 1965 President J. R. Berry gave 
a notice by telegram that a directors' meeting would be 
held on November 11, 1965, only two days after the send-
ing of the notice (R. 40). Not all directors received the 
notice before the meeting (R. 28). Only six of nine di-
rectors attended the illegally called meeting (R. 28). No 
written waivers of notice or of approval of the meeting of 
any alleged action thereat were ever made by any of the 
absent directors. The corporate articles required five 
days notice for a legal call of a directors' meeting (R. 28). 
Third-party plaintiff Berry in paragraph 8 of his state-
ment of facts has printed what he states to be a corporate 
resolution of November 11, 1966 (Berry's brief pp. 5-6). 
Obviously there can be no corporate resolution at an il-
legally called and held corporate meeting. Plaintiff 
pleads Exhibit 2, the alleged memorandum agreement of 
Berry's third party complaint. (R. 6). The alleged resolu-
tion set out in Berry's brief pp. 5-6 although of no legal 
force does nevertheless serve one purpose. It shows the 
clearly stated conditions which are found in said Exhibit 
2 that "the corporation, and their (all) directors (must) 
agree to fully hold him harmless from any claim,'' as a 
condition precedent to his alleged resignation as director 
and President. 
Tenth, J. R. Berry states in his brief, page 3, that "the 
directors and stockholders-recognized and acknowl-
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edged the security interest of J. R. Berry in and to said 
property," meaning the Homestead. There is no truth 
whatever in said statement. There is no support in any 
of the pleadings or documents cited in the affidavits for 
any such allegation. The truth is that the mention of an 
alleged security interest by the fiduciary-breaching J. R. 
Berry appeared for the first time when J. R. Berry and 
his attorney filed his counter-affidavit in this case. No 
appellate court decisions were cited by Berry that there 
can be any security interest in an agent who made an 
unauthorized contract for himself for his conflicting per-
sonal benefit to the detriment of his principal. 
Eleventh, the conditional and indefinite alleged mem-
orandum agreement reads as follows: 
11-11-65 
I hereby resign from my position as a director and 
President of Zions Investment Corporation providing 
that the existing Directors and the Corporation save 
me harmless fro many and all activities which I par-
ticipated in while President and Director of the cor-
poration. (Excepting embezzlement.) 
Robert H. Graham J. R. Berry 
Vivian M. Scheller 
R. C. Draper 
L. P. Slagle 
Signed before me this 
Joseph Anderson, Jr. 
Accepted - Secretary 
Joseph Anderson, Jr. 
11th day of November 1965. 
Gordon Christensen, Notary 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A RESIGNATION OF DIRECTORSHIP FOR ANY ECO-
NOMIC GAIN OR PROFIT IS ILLEGAL AND VOID. 
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Fletcher, Cyclopedia or Corporation Law, Per. ed. Sec-
tion 348 declares the law applicable to the present fact 
situation to be as follows: 
Sec. 348. Validity of agreement to resign for pecu-
niary consideration. 
It has been held that an agreement to resign as a 
corporate officer, for a pecuniary consideration, is 
void as against public policy. Thus, it has been said 
that if the whole or a part of a consideration be that 
a trustee resign his trust, the consideration is illegal. 
It is contra bona mores. Trustees of corporations owe 
duties to others besides themselves; they have been 
placed in a position of trust by the stockholders, and 
to those stockholders they must be faithful. It is a 
violation of that trust for them to be bought out of 
office. They may resign when they please, but they 
must not make profit or benefit to themselves in the 
matter of such resignation. 61 Sharrett v. Northfield 
Savings & Loan Assn., 272 App. Div. 835, 70 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 870, citing Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed) 
Sec. 348. Forbes v. McDonald 54 Cal. 98; Ballentine 
v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 668. 
In other words, directors cannot accept payment in 
any form or guise for their resignations and delivery 
of control or for the substitution of others in their 
place and are accountable for any monies so re-
ceived. 62 Mitchell v. Dilbeck 10 Cal. 2d 341, 74 P.2d 
233; McClure v. Law 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 338, 76 
Am. St. Rep. 262; Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 
822, 651, s.c. 30 N.Y. 2d 755; Porter v. Healey 244 
Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428. Note 1 Dodd & Baker, Cases on 
Business Associations 604. 
Contract to cause directors to resign and for others 
to be named by another corporation is ultra vires 
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under New Jersey law Hold v. California Develop-
ment Company 151 Fed. 3, and T.F. Pagel Lumber 
Co. v. Webster 231 Wis. 222, 285 N.W. 739. (Italics 
supplied for emphasis.) 
A brief analysis of some of the cases cited by Fletcher, 
supra, will show the wide application of the general rule 
that selling one's offices by resigning for economic gain 
or profit is illegal. 
The first paragraph above under Sec. 348 within quote 
marks is quoted verbatim from the 1880 California case 
of Forbes et .al. v. McDonald et. al. 54 Cal. 98 at p. 100. 
It is the corporate law today and has been ever since 1880 
in a situation which exists here. It was contra bona mores 
for Mr. J. R. Berry to attempt to bargain away his offices 
of Director and President for a valuable pecuniary con-
sideration. Neither he nor those claiming through him can 
legally state any claim for relief on such grounds. 
In the case of Sharrett v. Northfield Savings and Loan 
Association 1947, 272 App. Div. 835, 70 N.Y. Supp (2d) 
870 which cites Fletcher on Corporations on the above 
question; the plaintiff sought to enforce payment of a life 
pension alleging that the Port Richmond Association 
(merged into the defendant) contracted with him to that 
if he would resign his off ices of director and secretary 
and refrain from seeking reelection to office, and remove 
his real estate and insurance office from the building in 
which the offices of the association were located, the as-
sociation would give him a pension for life paying him 
$200 per month. 
Held, the contract to resign as a director for a personal 
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benefit to himself was a legally insufficient consideration. 
In the above case part of the consideration given would 
have been good and valid consideration had it been given 
by itself. However, in the earlier case of Ballantine v. 
Ferretti 1941, 28 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 688 the court broadly 
declared that: 
Contracts by which corporate officers or directors 
take pay " (economic benefits)" for their action as 
such are contrary to public policy, because of their 
nature and general tendency, without inquiry into 
any given case whether harm resulted in fact or 
whether complaint was actually made and that the 
law would not ordinarily undertake to apportion the 
entire consideration paid upon an illegal transaction 
merely because the transaction would have been 
legal if part of it had been eliminated,-. 
The Supreme Court of New York in Gerdes v. Reynolds 
1941, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622, 625 declared flatly the law to be: 
A corporate officer cannot legally "accept pay in any 
form or guise, direct or devious for their own resig-
nation." (note 19.) 
In the case of T. F. Pagel Lumber Co. v. Webster 1939, 
231 Wis. 222, 285 N.W. 789, one of the defenses raised by 
Webster on an action on his promissory note was that he 
had agreed to resign and did resign as director and man-
ager of the company. On the defense of such resignation 
as consideration the Wisconsin Supreme Court wrote: 
If Pagel agreed to resign in consideration of a 
promise not to sue on his note, the contract was il-
legal and void because contrary to public policy 13 
Am. Jr. 869 Sec. 888. See Koelbel v. Tecktonius 1938, 
228 Wis. 317, 280 N.W. 305. 
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Plaintiff Berry agrees with the above statements of law 
(Plfs. brief 7), but argues that an alleged agreement to 
pay the debts of another is not an agreement of pecuniary 
or measurable monetary value. This argument is pal-
pably unsound. The measure if Berry could prevail would 
be $5,000 plus 10% interest. 
Plaintiff also argues that the above rule of law is not , 
applicable to his case. He cites four cases each of which 
presents an entirely different fact situation from this 
case. The facts of this case fall squarely within the above 
rule of law. There is here no negotiation for an agreed 
sale of Mr. Berry's stock to the corporation or the direc-
tors, which would by itself be a valid contract. There is 
here no dispute regarding J. R. Berry's salary of $1,000 
per month being unpaid or any agreement whatever re-
garding that item. There is not in the alleged memoran-
dum agreement of 11-11-65 supra any consideration re-
cited other than the naked and exclusive offer to resign 
and the alleged resignation of J. R. Berry as President 
and Director. 
An enlarged but brief analysis of the cases cited by 
plaintiff will show their inapplicability to the fact-situa-
tion here. The SALE OF STOCK CASES cited by Plain-
tiff except the pertinent, California Mitchell case, which 
is added here, are: 
Joseph v. Ruff (1903) 81 N.Y. Supp. 546, Mitchell v. 
Dilbeck (1937) 10 Cal. 2d 341, 74 P. 2d 233, 
Mooney v. Willis Overland Motors (1953) 204 Fed. 
2d 888, and 
Raffner v. Sophie Mae Candy Corporation (1926) 
132 S.E. 396. 
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The Joseph case was an action by the Trustee in Bank-
ruptcy to set aside an alleged preferential transfer of 
corporate moneys to Mr. Ruff in the purchase of his stock 
by the corporation and the compromise of other claims 
which occurred more than four months prior to the filing 
in bankruptcy and while the corporation was still solvent. 
Held that the corporation could lawfully buy and pay for 
the stock as had been done while the corporation was 
solvent. The resignation was an incidental and necessary 
legal occurrance upon performance of the valid agree-
ment for the sale and purchase of all of the Director's 
stock. 
The Mitchell case, supra, upholds the general rule 
stated by Fletcher Section 348 supra in the following 
language: 
fl\Vhile directors may resign when they please, they 
must not make a profit to themselves in the matter 
of their resignation and to be bought out of office 
would be a violation of their trust. See authorities 
cited in 12 L.R.A. 1071lJThe court affirmed the rule 
of Forbes v. McDonald 54 Cal. 98, the leading case 
declaring a situation like the alleged Berry Hold 
Harmless agreement is contra bona mores, a breach 
of trust, illegal and void. 
The Ruffner case supra, was another case in which the 
corporation purchased all the stock of the Director and 
President, who thus disqualified himself for office and 
resigned as an incidental and legally necessary step to 
the valid sale of all of the stock of said person. The court 
held that the purchase of the stock and the concomitant 
resignation being in good faith and to serve the best 
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interests of the corporation was a valid stock purchase by 
the corporation from its President and Director at reason-
able value therefor and declared that purchase by a cor-
poration of its own stock is valid. 
Where the stock is not retired but is held for resale 
and reissue and the purchase was not prejudicial to 
creditors after the transaction was completed. 
The Mooney case supra like the other cases cited by 
plaintiff's attorney, David E. West, are cases mainly deal-
ing with the question of whether a corporation can le-
gally pur~hase stock from a director or whether such 
transaction may be set aside as improper dealing of an 
agent and trustee with his principal, the corporation. 
The Mooney case, supra, was one in which the plaintiff 
stockholder had sold all his stock to the corporation and 
resigned and sought to recover from the corporation the 
expenses including legal fees for defending a minority 
stockholders suit against him under claim of statutory 
right of a Delaware statute 44 Del. Laws c. 125 Apr. 15, 
1953 allowing such actions against the corporation by its 
director who had been sued for mismanagement or fraud. 
The case involved the question of fact as to whether 
the director coming in had the best interests of the cor-
poration at heart and the court comments on that fact in 
citing with approval the rule of illegality of bargaining a 
resignation of office for economic value and cites with 
approval "2 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations Sec. 
348", but again as in the other cases distinguishes the fact 
situation from the situation existing in the Berry case 
and in the cases cited by Fletcher Sec. 348, supra. 
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Nor can Third-party Plaintiff J. R. Berry take any 
comfort from the California case of Crispinel v. Color 
Corporation of America (1958) (2nd Dist. Cal. App.) 325 
P. 2d 565. In that case plaintiff was employed for ~ of 
full time in counselling the board and officers and em-
ployees at a salary of $13,000 per month under a written 
contract which provided that (par. 6) 
"Crespinel understands that it may be necessary for 
the business of the corporation that a seat on the 
board of directors be available, for instance in the 
event that other financial interests become associated 
with Cine color" and he agreed to terminate his em-
ployment and resign "at the request of the majority 
of the board." 
The request was made, the resignation had, a large 
sum in partial settlement paid to Crispinel. He, however, 
sued for $14,500 claimed due, received judgment which 
was affirmed. The defense was that the agreement was 
illegal because it contained the agreement to resign at 
request of the board. The court held that the particular 
agreement was not violative of public policy but affirmed 
the general rule that an agreement like that of the al-
leged Berry hold harmless agreement would be invalid 
in California. The court in rendering its opinion in the 
Crespinel case wrote; after citing the case of Trumbo v. 
Bank of Berkeley 77 Cal. App. 704, 709, 176 P. 2d 376, 379 
as establishing the general rule in the Berry situation: 
A director may not contract away his discretionary 
vote or director's position for a consideration. Such 
agreement is violative of public policy and is void. 
The Court in analyzing the particular facts of the 
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Crespinel case said that the particular contract was dis-
tinguishable from the situation wherein a director had 
bargained away his position as a director for a consider-
ation. The consideration which Mr. Crispinel received 
was for his contract of services, not for his resignation. 
Nor can any help be found for Mr. J. R. Berry in his 
desire to be free from all responsibility for his own bad , 
management by having five directors pay all of his debts 
during more than two years except the debt which would 
amount to an embezzlement,-in the note in 28Cinn. L. 
Rev. 380-81. That law note by some bright law student is 
centered around the Crispenel case, supra. After distin-
guishing the valid stock sale cases from the situation here 
of an attempt to force other directors to buy Mr. Berry 
out of office the note writer concludes; regarding the two 
distinguishable fact situations: 
Where the circumstances appear questionable and 
the director has in fact 'sold out' a breach of his 1 
fiduciary duty becomes apparent and his contract 
would be void in spite of the statute permitting him 
to deal with his company. 
The note writer is here referring to the amendment of 
the California Corporation Code Sec. 820 (1952) which , 
dispensed with the former rule disqualifying a director 
from dealing in any way with his corporation for his own 
benefit. If plaintiff wished to raise the question of a rea-
sonable price for a resignation by a director and Pres-
ident, he should state the fact by affidavit that he was 
attempting to bargain away his offices for a certain or an 
approximate amount of thousands of dollars and then 
argue that the true figure would be reasonable under the 
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circumstances. This he has not done. 
POINT II 
THE UNFULFILLED CONDITIONS OF RESIGNA-
TION EXPRESSLY STATED ON THE FACE OF EX-
HIBIT 2 DEFEATS THIRD-PARTY CLAIM FOR RE-
LIEF. 
Exhibit 2, the resignation instrument, is expressly con-
ditional on its face. It is clearly not a bilateral agreement 
of promise for a promise. Williston, Contracts 1938 ed., 
Sec. 13. 
It is stated as a unilateral, conditional act of resignation 
for contemplated future acts of saving harmless as in-
demnitors the drafter of the instrument provided that 
''the corporation and" (all) "existing directors save me 
harmless." The affidavit of Director Robert H. Graham 
shows that only five directors' names appear on Exhibit 
L out of nine directors other than Berry (R. 16, and see 
also Secretary Anderson's affidavit, R. 28, 37). The con-
uition of all existing directors signing is not fulfilled. Ex-
hibit 2 has no validity. If the offer is not accepted by 
performance of the act stated as a condition precedent 
then no unilateral contract arises. The condition of in-
demnification is not performed and Berry was still a Di-
rector, albeit an inactive one, until November 17, 1965 
when the resignation became automatically effective by 
reason of corporate article SIXTH ( c) (R. 28). 
The second express condition on the face of Exhibit 2 
is that the corporation-Zions Investment Corporation-
:::.hould become a signing indemnitor on the alleged agree-
ment. The instrument shows on its face that the corpor-
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ation did not sign. Section 25-5-4 (2), Utah Code 1953 
requires that an agreement to answer for the debt of an-
other is void unless there is an agreement "in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged." The purported 
signature "accepted Joseph A. Anderson Jr. Secretary" 
is merely descriptio personae of the individual signing 
and is not in law a subscribed signature of the corpora-
tion, Zions Investment Corporation. 
The significance of a condition is declared as follows: 
Williston, Contract, Vol. IV, 1936, Sec. 1244. "When 
non-compliance with a condition on which a contract 
is delivered by a surety relieves him from liability. , 
If the surety delivers his contract to the creditor 
upon a condition or in return for a counter-promise, 1 
and the creditor fails to observe the condition or to 
keep the promise, he cannot hold the surety; but 
often the surety's contract is not delivered by him 
directly to the creditor, but to the principal or a co-
surety to whom some condition is stated. It is com-
mon situation for a surety to have signed a bond or 
other contract, and the principal or a co-surety who 
was expected to join in the contract, and whose name 
is perhaps recited in the instrument as a party, to 
have failed to execute it. The signature of the prin-
cipal or co-surety may be altogether lacking, or it 
may appear to be signed without authority." 
POINT III 
ALLEGED MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT IS VOID 
FOR INDEFINITNESS OR IF REGARDED AS DEF· 
INITE IS THEN VOID FOR ILLEGALITY IN AGREE· 
ING TO PAY ALL POSSIBLE CRIMINAL FINES 
AGAINST BERRY EXCEPT FOR EMBEZZELMENT. 
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One phrase in the memorandum reads: 
... save me harmless from any and all activities 
which I participated in while President and Director 
of the corporation. (Excepting embezzlement.) 
This should be construed most strongly against the 
drafter J. R. Berry. The word "activities" is broader than 
the word "debts." If the word "activities" be construed in 
its broadest meaning it would then make an agreement 
to pay all criminal fines which might be imposed for 
negligent or reckless driving of an automobile while 
Berry was President of the corporation and for violation 
of the state securities act, and for securing money by 
false pretenses by fraudulent representations made in 
selling stock and condominium units etc., except embez-
zlement. The word "activities" appears all too elastic to 
be definite enough to be contractual. Williston, Contracts 
1938 ed., Sec. 37. 
If the word "activities" be definite enough to be con-
tractual and would, if otherwise valid, hold Mr. Berry 
harmless from criminal fines of any and all kinds except 
embezzlement then the memorandum is illegal as against 
public policy in tending to exhonerate one from criminal 
responsibility of fines. 
An agreement by the terms of which one person as-
sumes punishment for the guilt of another is im-
proper and void. 17 C.J.S. Sec. 227 citing United 
States v. McCue, D.C. Conn., 178 Fed. Supp. 426. 
POINT IV 
NO CORPORATE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ILLEGAL-
LY CALLED MEETING OF NOVEMBER 11, 1965. 
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The undisputed fact is that the corporate article 
SIXTH (b) required five days notice of a directors' meet. 
ing (R. 28). Berry sent a telegraph notice on November 9, 
1966 calling a directors' meeting two days later (R. 40). 
Only six directors responded to the notice. There were no 
waivers made or filed by any of the three absent direc-
tors (R. 28). 
On the foregoing undisputed facts the following case 
gives the clearly established rule of corporation law 
showing the resolution claimed by plaintiff (plf's brief 
p. 5) of no legal effect. 
Where the call of a corporate meeting does not conform 
to the requirements of the statute or the corporate ar-
ticles if the statute allows a shorter time of notice by 
article or by law contract the meeting is invalid and at-
tempted action thereat is also invalid. Glehe v. Arnett 
(1924) 38 Id. 763, 225 Pac. 797, 799. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY BERRY 
IN THE ALLEGED CONTRACT OF NOVEMBER 16, 
1965. 
The above statement of facts shows that on and after 
February 20, 1965 J. R. Berry and wife were legally 
bound to assign the Homestead purchase contract to the 
corporation (minutes R. 32; Company Prospectus R. 19; 
last paragraph p. 1 of alleged agreement of November 16, 
1966, R. 6a). 
It is elementary contract law that promising to do what 
one is already legally bound to do (here assign the Home· 
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stead purchase contract to the corporation (R. 6a, last 
paragraph of page 1 of Exhibit 3) is no consideration for 
the promise of another. Necessarily the alleged agree-
ment of November 16, 1965 is void for lack of consider-
ation moving to the defendants. 
POINT VI 
ALLEGED AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 16, 1965 IS 
VOID FOR UNFILLED CONDITION THAT ALL FIVE 
DEFENDANTS SHOULD BECOME JOINT OBLIGORS. 
Exhibit 3 of plaintiff's complaint shows on its face that 
the alleged agreement of November 16, 1965 was to be a 
joint obligation of the five defendant directors named as 
Third parties therein, had it been supported by consider-
ation and had the condition that all five sign thereon been 
fulfilled. The agreement while naming the five defend-
ants as Third parties does not state that the alleged agree-
ment of indemnification is to be joint and several. On the 
obligation on the earlier $50,000.00 note the directors 
pledged to each other their obligation of contribution. By 
having all five defendants sign, a right of contribution 
would then exist provided the agreement were otherwise 
legal. 
The affidavits of both parties are unequivocal in swear-
ing that it was a condition that all five defendants sign 
the alleged November 16th agreement. The insistence of 
that mutual intent is found in J. R. Berry's affidavit as 
follows: 
6. That following the meeting of November 11, 1965 
and prior to the conveyance to the Homestead prop-
erty to the corporation all of the parties concluded 
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that their agreement should be reduced to a more 
formal instrument ... that L. P. Slagle and Vivian 
Schellar were not present at the meeting of Novem. 
ber 17, 1965 but that the remaining third party de-
fendants represented that they were in fact acting 
for and on behalf of the two absent parties, ... 
(R. 23). 
The last clause is wholly immaterial in view of the 
legal requirement, supra, that indemnitors must sub-
scribe their agreement otherwise no liability can arise. 
(Utah Code 1953, Sec. 25-5-4(2). 
However, the first clause of the above quotation shows 
Berry concurring with the Directors in their sworn state-
ment that it was the mutual intent that all five directors 
should sign before there could be any liability on the 
directors, had the agreement been otherwise valid. (Di-
rectors' affidavit, R. 17). The condition was never ful-
filled. Vivian Schellar and L. P. Slagle never signed the 
agreement and continued to refuse to sign it (R. 17). 
POINT VII 
J. R. BERRY DOES NOT PLEAD AND DOES NOT 
HA VE ANY SECURITY INTEREST. 
As stated in the foregoing statement of facts, J. R. 
Berry never made any claim of a security interest until 
the filing of his affidavit about September 20, 1966. He 
does not plead any claim of a security interest. The law 
does not allow a wrongdoing agent any security interest. 
especially when he surrenders possession of the property 
on which is claimed a possessory lien. The law is stated 
in Corpus Juris Secundum as follows: 
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3 C.J.S. 140. In the absence of full knowledge and 
consent on the part of his principal, an agent may not 
acquire any right or title in the subject matter of 
the agency by the use of his position. 
An agent found guilty of breach of duty in this re-
spect will be regarded as holding his newly acquired 
interests as trustee for his principal 39 since all 
rights, title or interests inure to the benefit of the 
principal and the agent may be compelled to transfer 
them to the latter 40 and to account for all profits 
and benefits gained thereby. 
While an agent is ordinarily "entitled to reimburse-
ment for as much of the purchase money as repre-
sented by his own funds" ... 
. . . An agent cannot recover from his principal in 
any transaction in which the agent's interest was 
antagonistic to the principal, unless such interest 
was fully and fairly disclosed to the principal and 
the principal's consent secured. 
3 C.J.S. Sec. 198. A failure of the agent to keep and 
render proper accounts may deprive the agent of 
his right of reimbursement for expenses, losses or 
damages arising from his performance of his duties 
under his agency. 
3 C.J.S. Sec. 200. If an agent is performing his duties 
as authorized then he gains "a specific lien upon the 
principal's property in his possession for his ex-
penses during the course of his agency with refer-
ence to that property." 
3 C.J.S. Sec. 201. An agent's lien may be extinguished 
or lost by yielding possession of the property and 
upon waiver of his right it is permanently lost. 
In this case J. R. Berry asked the corporation at the 
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stockholders' meeting on February 20, 1965 simply to 
agree to reimburse him for his costs of acquisition of the 
Homestead for himself and wife and the corporation 
agreed. He delivered possession to the corporation on , 
April 1, 1965 when the directors had signed to be liable 
for $50,000 second payment on the Holimestead, and 
claimed no lien at that time or in November 1965 and the 
lien, if it ever existed was lost when the directors became 
obligated relying on the fact that he had assigned the pur-
chase contract to the corporation. 26a 
POINT VIII 
FACTS CREATE AN ESOPPEL AGAINST J. R 
BERRY. 
The undisputed facts are that on February 20, 1965 
Berry represented to the stockholders that he was assign· 
ing his purchase contract of the Homestead to the cor· 
poration (R. 32) and that he caused to be published in 
the company Prospectus that such had been done. 
The undisputed facts are that purchasing stockholders, 
persons purchasing condominium contracts and partic-
ularly the five defendant directors relied and acted on 
the representations that the Homestead purchase con-
tract had been so assigned to the corporation. That at the 
time defendants signed the $50,000.00 note as co-makers 
to make the April 1, 1965 down payment by the corpor· 
ation they fully relied upon the representation in the 
Prospectus (R. 19) and representation repeatedly being 
made by Mr. Berry and the salesmen whom he supervised 
to persons purchasing stock (R. 54, 59, and 60) and to 
persons purchasing condominiums (R. 41, 54, 57, 58, 62 
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and 63) that the Homestead purchase contract had been 
assigned to the corporation and that the corporation fully 
owned its own unencumbered equity in the Homestead. 
These facts created an equitable estoppel against J. R. 
Berry to later claim that the directors must pay his debts 
and liabilities incurred over a three-year period in order 
to have him assign his dry trust rights and interests in 
the Homestead property to the corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully submit that the above facts 
and the applicable law indicate that the summary judg-
ment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. Ladru Jensen 
1536 Harvard A venue 
Salt Lake City, Utah and 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendants. 
